Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Guy Barco Zewadski v. Ford Motor Credit
Company, Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kim R. Wilson; Thomas F. Taylor; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Ford Motor
Credit Company; Brian C. Harrison; Harris, Carter & Harrison; Attorneys for Rick Warner LincolnMercury; Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent.
Guy B. Zewadski; Appearing pro-se; Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Guy Barco Zewadski v. Ford Motor Credit Company, Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury, No. 920226 (Utah Court of
Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3152

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

"PWADSKI,
. yppellant.
)TOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellee,

.4fPfc'A;,; Sis 9211226
( ae J?> !«:

and,
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY,
Defendant, Appellee.

jRMIEILQJLTHKAJPEELLAJil
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN PRESIDING

Kim R. V, Uson
TiiOnias i . i*i} u,.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys for Ford Motor Credit Company
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
GUY B. ZEWADSKI
Attorney's for Defendant/Respondent
Appearing pro-se
P.O. Box 1232
and;
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84110
Brian C. Harrison, Esq.
Telephone: (801) 355-8180
Harris, Carter, & Harrison
Appellant
Attorneys for Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury
3325 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801)375-9801
Attorney's for Defendant/ Respondant

TN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

APPEAL No. 920226

VS.

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellee,
and,
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY,
Defendant, Appellee.

Category 16

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN PRESIDING

Kim R. Wilson
Thomas F. Taylor
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys for Ford Motor Credit Company
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
GUYB. ZEWADSKI
Attorney's for Defendant/Respondent
Appearing pro-se
P.O. Box 1232
and;
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84110
Brian C. Harrison, Esq.
Telephone: (801) 355-8180
Harris, Carter, & Harrison
Appellant
Attorneys for Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury
3325 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801)375-9801
Attorney's for Defendant/ Respondant

PARTIES TO ACTION
PLAINTIFF/ APPELLANT
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI
P.O. BOX 1232
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110
(801) 355-8180
DEFENDANT/ APPELLEES
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY
REGISTERED AGENT
RICHARD L. WARNER
370 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
#501
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
DEFENDANT
AND
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY
A DELAWARE CORPORATION
WITH PRINCIPLE PLACE OF BUSINESS IN
DEARBORN, MICHIGAN
WITH A BRANCH OFFICE AT
535 EAST 4500 SOUTH, SUITE D-40
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107
REGISTERED AGENT
C.T. CORPORATION SYSTEM
8TH FLOOR
50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
DEFENDANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATUTES

ii

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS..

3

NATURE AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

7

STATEMENT OF FACTS

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

14
6

POINT 1

16

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DISMISSING ZEWADSKI'S COMPLAINT,
FINDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
WERE EXCLUDED
POINT II

20

EVIDENCE PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING ZEWADSKI'S COMPLAINT AS
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
POINT III

25

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON FORD CREDIT'S COUNTERCLAIM
WHEN SUPPORTED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
WERE NOT CONTRADICTED

POINT IV
THE CONTRACT AT IS UNCONSCIONABLE UNDER
THE "UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT"

33

PAGE
POINT V

40

SUMMARY DISPOSITION AVAILABLE ON SOME
ISSUES OF CASE INCLUDING ISSUE OF
UNCONSCIONABILITY
CONCLUSION

45

APPENDIX
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COMPLAINT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIM
LEASE CONTRACT
SERVICE CONTRACT

A-l
A-2
B-l
B-2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
PAGE
Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248
(Utah Ct. App.1988)

42

Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455,
462 (Utah 1983)

37

Bill Stremmel Motors. Inc. v. IDS Leasing
Corp.. 89 Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654 (1973)

37

Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner LincolnMercurv. 681 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1984)

14,19,20

Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah
1978)

24, 32

Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah
1989)

42

Bullfrog Mftrina Inc. v. QUbert M, h$n\Z,
501 P.2d 266, 28 Utah 2d 261 (1972)

35,36

Corbet v. Corbet. 472 P.2d 430,
24 Utah 2d 378 (1970)

24,

Poppet al. v. Richards. 135 P. 98,43Utah332
(Utah S. Ct.1913)

45

Fashion Place INV. v. Salt Lake County.
776 P.2d 941,943 (Utah App. 1989)

35,43

General Insurance Company of America v.
Camicero Dvnastv Corporation , 545 P.2d 502,503 (Utah
1976)

31,

Henrettv v. Manti Citv Corp.. 791 P.2d 506,510
(Utah 1990)

37,43

ii

Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent. Inc. 477 P.2d 150,
(1970), 25 Utah 2d 121

21,

Irving Leasing Corp. v. M & H Tire Co..
475 N.E. 2d 127 (Ohio 1984)

38

Jackson v.Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982)

22,

Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co.. 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983)
Landes v.Capital Citv Bank. 795 P.2d 1121,1131
(Utah 1990)

22,

Lockhart Co. v. Anderson. 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982)... 17,
Mountain States. Etc. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles.
681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984)
Pentecost v. M.W. Harward. 699 P.2d 696 (Utah
1985)
Pitcher v. State of Utah Department of Social
Services. 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983)

21,
22,30,
24,

Power Svs. & Controls. Inc. v. Keith's Elec.
Constr. Co.. 765 P.2d 5, 9, (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

35,

Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and
Guaranty Insurance Underwriters. Inc..
380 P.2d 135 , 14 Utah 2d 169 (1963)

24,

Resource Management Co. v. Weston
Ranch and Livestock Co.. 706 P.2d 1028
(Utah 1985)

37,

Rosander v. Larsen. 376 P.2d 146,
14 Utah 2d. 1 (1962)

24,

Rothe v. Mahoney Cadillac. Inc..
492 N.E. 2d 497, 503 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1986)

18,19

Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291(Utah
1978)

21

ii

Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 (1967),
19 Utah 2d 292

21

Sorenson v. Beers. 585 P.2d 458 (Utah
1978)

22

State ex rel. Div. Consumer Protection v.
Rio Vjsta QU, Ltd,, 786 P.2d 1343, 1347
(Utah 1990)

37,43

Thompson v. Ford Motor Co.. 384 P.2d 109 ,
14 Utah 2d 334 (1963)

24,

Utah Department of Transportation v. Fuller.
603 P.2d 814 (Utah 1979)

24,

Wadev.Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006,1016,1017 (Utah
1991)

36,37

Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co.. 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C. Or. 1965)

37

STATUTES
15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2301 et seq

5,6,17

15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2308(a)

7,15,18,20

15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2308(c)

7,15,18,20,

Utah Code 13-11-1
Utah Code 1 3 - U - 2

4,

Utah Code 13-11-3

4, 33

VtahCQde 1 3 - U - 4

5,34, 39

Utah Code 13-11-5.

5,34, 36, 41

VtflhCode 1 3 - U - 1 9

5,
ii

U.R.C.R. Rule 15(b)

3, 30,

U.R.C.P. Rule 56(^1

3,
OTHER STATUTES

Restatement of the Law. Second. Contracts. Sec. 202

36

Restatement of the Law. Second. Contracts. Sec. 209

36

Restatement of the Law. Second. Contracts. Sec.212

36

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
vs.
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellee,
and,
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY,
Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL No. 920226
Category 16

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Appellant, Guy Barco Zewadski, (hereinafter
"Zewadski"), appearing pro-se, hereby submits this brief.
JURISDICTION
X.

The Supreme Court of Utah has appellate jurisdiction

over orders, judgments and decrees of any court of record over
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to the
Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, Sec. 3, and U.C.A. 78-22(3)(j); said Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals
and its jurisdiction is based upon U.C.A.78-2a-3(h^: and Rules 3,
4, and 42, of the U.R.A.P..
2*

This is an appeal from a final summary judgment in a contract

dispute in favor of Ford Motor Credit Company's counterclaim, entered by the

l

Honorable Pat B. Brian of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and orders entered prior to final disposition, granting a
summary judgment dismissing Zewadski's complaint, and attorneys' fees.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether trial court erred in finding all warranties as to

merchantabiUty or fitness for purpose were excluded by a disclaimer clause in
the lease contract, permitting summary judgment, or if such disclaimer clauses
are without effect in consumer transactions for new consumer products which
have express warranties or service contracts, as a matter of law? Question of
law reviewed for correctness.
2*

Whether the admissible evidence before the trial court below is

sufficient to support the granting of the summary judgment order, and its
findings, dismissing Zewadski's First Amended Complaint? Question of law
reviewed for correctness.
3*

Whether summary judgment in favor of Ford Motor Credit

Company's ("Ford Credit") counterclaim was available as a matter of law?
Question of law reviewed for correctness.
4.

Whether the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act serves to protect

Zewadski from unconscionable or deceptive practices by Rick Warner
Lincoln-Mercury ("Rick Warner") and Ford Credit in this case? This is a
question of law reviewed for correctness.

2

5*

Whether the granting of attorneys fees to Ford Credit was

supported by law in view of the issues presented hereinbefore
absent showing that the all terms of the contract for such
recovery had been met; and whether Ford Credit failed to
apportion the fees to reflect only expenses incurred in the
counterclaim contrary to an order of the trial court to so
apportion? This is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE

PROVISIONS

1.

U.R.C.P. Rule 56(c), (Summary Judgment):
"(c) Motion and Proceedings thereon. The motion
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers, to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages."

2. U.R.C.P. Rule 15(b), (Amended and supplemental pleadings):
"(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be sub served thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a
3

continuance , if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence.
3* "U.C.S.P.A.":

U.C.A. 13-11-1 through 22, amended:

U.C.A. 13-11-2: Construction and purposes of act.
"This act shall be construed liberally to promote the
following policies:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law
governing consumer sales practices;
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit
deceptive and unconscionable sales practices;
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales
practices not inconsistent with the policies of the
Federal Trade Commission Act relating to consumer
protection;"
U.C.A. 13-11-3: Definitions:
(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease,
assignment, award by chance, or other written or oral
transfer or disposition of goods, services, or other
property both tangible and intangible (except
securities and insurance) to a person for primarily
personal, family, or household purposes, or for
purposes that relate to a business opportunity that
requires both his expenditure of money or property and
his personal services on a continuing basis and in
which he has not been previously engaged, or a
solicitation or offer by a supplier with respect to any
of these transfers or dispositions. It includes any
offer or solicitation, any agreement, and any
performance of an agreement with respect to any of
these transfers or dispositions. "
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation,
government, governmental
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate trust,
partnership, association, cooperative, or any other
legal entity."
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor,
offeror, broker, or other person who regularly solicits,
engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether
or not he deals directly with the consumer."
4

U.C.A. 13-11-5(1)(2)(3): (Unconscionable act or practice):
"(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier
in connection with a consumer transaction violates this
act whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a
question of law for the court. If it is claimed or
appears to the court that an act or practice may be
unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its setting,
purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its
determination.
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is
unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances
which the supplier knew or had reason to know."
U.C.A. 13-11-4 (l)(2)(2j): Deceptive act or practice:
"(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in
connection with a consumer transaction violates this
chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2)
Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a
supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the
supplier, with intent to deceive.
(2)(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves
or does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer of
warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights,
remedies, or obligations if the indication is false."
U.C.A. 13-11-19. Action by consumer:
"(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a
violation of this chapter may recover, but not in a
class action, actual damages or $2,000.00, whichever
is greater, plus court costs."
4.
Magnuson-Moss- Warranty- Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2301(1)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8):
"(1) The term "consumer product" means any tangible
personal property which is distributed in commerce
and which is normally used for personal, family, or
household purposes (including any such property
intended to be attached to or installed in any real
property without regard to whether it is so attached or
5

installed).
(3) The term "consumer" means a buyer (other than
for purposes of resale) of any consumer product, any
person to whom such product is transferred during the
duration of an implied or written warranty (or service
contract) applicable to the product, and any other
person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty
(or service contract) or under applicable State law to
enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor)
the obligations of the warranty (or service contract).
(4) The term "supplier" means any person engaged in
the business of making a consumer product directly or
indirectly available to consumers. "
(5)
The term "warrantor" means any supplier or
other person who gives or offers to give a written
warranty or who is or may be obligated under an
implied warranty."
(6)
The term "written warranty" means —
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written
promise made in connection with the sale of
a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer
which relates to the nature of the material or
workmanship and affirms or promises that
such material or workmanship is defect free
or will meet a specified level of performance
over a specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection
with the sale by a supplier of a consumer
product to refund, repair, replace, or take
other remedial action with respect to such
product in the event that such product fails
to meet the specifications set forth in the
undertaking, which written affirmation,
promise, or undertaking becomes part of the
basis of the bargain between a supplier and a
buyer for purposes other than resale of such
product.
(7)
The term "implied warranty" means an implied
warranty arising under State law (as modified by
sections 108 and 104(a) in connection with the sale by
a supplier of a consumer product.
(8)
term "service contract" means a contract in
writing to perform, over a fixed period of time or for a
specified duration, services relating to the
6

maintenance or repair (or both) of a consumer
product."
15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2308: Implied Warranties, restrictions on
disclaimers...
"(a) No supplier may disclaim or modify... any
implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such
consumer product if (1) such supplier makes any
written warranty to the consumer with respect to such
consumer product, or (2) at the time of sale, or within
90 days thereafter, such supplier enters into a service
contract with the consumer which applies to such
consumer product.
(c) A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in
violation of this section shall be ineffective for
purposes of this chapter and State law. "
N A T U R E AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.
±.

This is an action brought in a contract dispute

wherein appellant Zewadski brought action, with a verified
complaint, against respondents Ford Credit and Rick Warner

for

rescission of contract and damages regarding a lease of a new
automobile for personal use, alleging fraud and
misrepresentation, and Ford Credit brought a counterclaim to
enforce the contract. Zewadski answered setting forth
affirmative defenses of estoppel and fraud, and denials.
2.

After hearings on briefed arguments, wherein Ford

Credit submitted no affidavits or impeaching evidence, Ford
Credit was granted a summary judgment dismissing Zewadski's
complaint.

7

i

Ford Credit moved for summary judgment on their

counterclaim with no supporting affidavits, and the court
granted that motion finding Zewadski in default of the contract.
Zewadski filed several affidavits and verified pleadings
opposing summary judgment.
4.

Several interim motions of Zewadski to amend the

pleadings and vacate interlocutory summary judgment on
Zewadski's complaint were heard and denied on basis that the
issues sought to supplement had already been heard and decided.
£.

Judge Pat B. Brian entered Final Judgment on

September 20, 1991, reaffirmed by an Order entered December
30, 1991.
<L

The trial court granted Zewadski's motion that Ford

Credit's attorneys' fees affidavit apportion the fees to claim
recovery only for fees directly incurred in the counterclaim, and
ordered Ford Credit to file a supplemental attorneys' fees
affidavit and amended order.
.2*

Zewadski filed a notice of Appeal January 29, 1992,

and was assigned number 920054 with the Supreme Court.
IL

This matter was thereafter referred to the Court of

Appeals of the State of Utah, and is now presently pending

8

before this body in the instant case as number 920226-CA.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
1.

This case was instituted by Zewadski to rescind a

contract, recover deposits and damages, for fraud by Zewadski's
filing a verified complaint (TR-2 -7), and verified amended
complaint (TR-9-19) on April 4, 1989. The suit was brought by
Zewadski against both Rick Warner, and Ford Credit (TR-2,
TR-9), and both answered (TR-22-31; TR-110-114).
2u

The lease contract was negotiated between Zewadski

and Rick Warner, and was assigned to Ford Credit upon its
signing, pursuant to terms of the contract (TR-303, TR-17-18,
TR-26, TR-550, TR-553-554).
3.

The contract was for the lease of a new passenger

automobile, for personal use (TR-17; TR-553-554; TR-549-550),
which, as part of the bargain, expressly included a service
contract, incorporated by reference upon the face of the lease
instrument (TR-17-18; TR-305, TR-550-554, 554a, 554b).
4a

The suit was instituted after Zewadski discovered the

misrepresentations of the automobile and lease, and sought cure,
was offered no cure by Rick Warner or Ford Credit, who denied
warranty responsibilities and would not agree to rescind the

9

contract (TR-4, TR-10-11, TR-182-183, TR-270).
iL

Zewadski gave written notice of rescission of the

contract and returned the automobile promptly upon realization
that Rick Warner and/or Ford Credit denied existence of
warranty responsibilities.( TR-167-183, 182; TR-351, TR-270,
TR-4, TR-11, TR-348-353).
(L

Zewadski verified his Complaint (TR-7), and First

Amended Complaint (TR-16), setting forth facts under oath.
T.

Ford Credit answered to Zewadski's complaint and

counterclaimed to enforce the terms of the lease, alleging
default for failure to make payments, (TR-22-27), to which
Zewadski answered, (TR-48-55).
fL

Summary judgments issued on both the complaint,

(TR-228-230); and on the counterclaim(TR-573-575).
JL

Zewadski was deposed by both Rick Warner and Ford

Credit on the 14th day of September, 1989, however said
deposition was not filed with the trial court and is not part of
the record on appeal.
10.

Summary Judgment was granted dismissing Zewadski's

complaint upon the courts finding: "that all warranties, if any,
as to merchantability or fitness for purpose were excluded" ,

10

"that there is no credible showing that the vehicle failed to
perform within acceptable standards", "that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact", and "that Ford Motor Credit
Company is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law" (TR-228230).
11.

A second Summary Judgment was granted in favor of

Ford Credit's counterclaim upon the court finding: "there is no
remaining issue as to any material fact in this case, including
but not limited to, such issues regarding service contracts or
warranties", "that all events have occurred which entitle FMCC
to recover a judgment from Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the
Lease", and "that FMCC is entitled to judgment on its
Counterclaim against Plaintiff as a matter of law" (TR-573-575).
12.

During the time between the summary judgment on

Zewadski's complaint, and the final summary judgment upon
Ford Credit's counterclaim, Zewadski submitted several
motions with affidavits, which were heard, and for which orders
and findings were entered, attempting to get leave of the court
to supplement or amend his complaint and first amended
complaint (TR-376-376a; TR-383-392; TR-367-370); and his
answer to Ford Credits counterclaim (TR-283-293, TR-268-278,
TR-296-300), vacate an order (TR-355-366, TR-367-372), all
ll

based upon affidavits and memorandums, and verified proposed
supplemental pleadings (TR-377-382) (TR-337-343) showing
that the contract which Ford Credit sought enforcement of was
unenforceable due to a fraud upon its face, and/ or, was
unconscionable (TR- 268-278, TR-296-300, TR-283-292), TR376-376a, TR-383-392, TR-367-370, TR-355-366, TR-367-372).
Ford Credit offered no supporting affidavits or evidence
opposing these motions. The court denied Zewadski's motion to
vacate the first summary judgment of January 2, 1991 (TR-501),
and his motion to supplement his complaint and first amended
complaint (TR-500-501), finding that Zewadski offered no new
factual or legal argument beyond what had been briefed prior to
the first summary judgment (TR-500), apparently referring to
Zewadski's affidavit and supplemental pleadings opposing
summary judgment on complaint (TR-167-196 ).
13»

The court denied Zewadski's motion to supplement his answer to

Ford Credit's counterclaim, after reviewing the proposed answer (TR-500501)(TR-337-343), and hearing extensive argument (TR-580-581), finding
that his amended answer to counterclaim was based upon and raised factual
and legal issues regarding a service contract and warranties, upon which the
court had held do not exist or are not relevant in the case (TR-580-581).
14.

Ford Credit submitted an attorneys fee affidavit, (TR12

418-427); a supplemental attorneys fee affidavit, (TR-565-575);
and last, after a court order, another supplemental attorneys'
fee affidavit (TR-504-538).
15.

After the final Summary Judgment was entered,

including an award of attorneys fees (TR-573-575), Zewadski
moved the court to strike the attorneys' fee affidavits (TR-586589, 590-593) questioning the legal basis of the award, in
which proper apportionment of fees was brought in issue (TR638-640). A hearing was had on the attorneys' fees issues (TR721-726 ), and the trial court granted Zewadski's motion and
ordered Ford Credit to file a supplemental attorneys' fee
affidavit that properly apportioned the attorneys' fees to show
those due under the contract, and law, and further comply with
Utah law (TR-722-723) (TR-679-680), and to file an amended
order reflecting correct fees (TR-724, lines 16-22).
16.

Zewadski moved for a new trial (TR-594-595, TR-597-

604, 605-607) which was decided against Zewadski, embodied in
a "Supplemental Order" (TR-679-680).
17.

The trial court record doesn't contain transcripts for

(1) the hearing on the motion for summary judgment on the first
amended complaint(TR-228-230) and; (2) the hearing on

13

Zewadski's motions to (a) supplement the complaint, (b) vacate
the summary judgment on the complaint, (c) supplement
Zewadski's answer to Ford Credits counterclaim; and Ford
Credit's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim,
(TR-498-501), (TR-570-582, TR-573-575).
17.

The Trial Court found that the instant lease was a true

lease (TR-574).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1*
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE
UNLESS THE MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THERE IS
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT.
Summary judgment in this case was an error of law as
there are genuine issues of material fact. The trial court erred in
interpreting the law regarding disclaimer clauses in consumer
transactions. Ford Credit submitted no affidavits, depositions,
or other evidentiary material to contradict Zewadski's sworn
facts in verified complaint and affirmative defences of estoppel
and fraud supported by affidavits and verified pleadings.
2,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES WERE PROPERLY
DISCLAIMED
a.)

The trial court apparently relied on Billings

Yamaha v. Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercurv. 681 P.2d 1276 (Utah
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1984), concerning a dispute between two merchants, dealers in
vehicles, wherein the U.C.C. law was applied to validate the
clause disclaiming implied warranties.
b.) In a consumer transaction such as this case,
implied warranties survive disclaimer clauses in contracts if
there is a service contract. 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2308(a)(c).
3.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
AND ERRED IN WEIGHING CREDITABILITY AND
VERITY OF UN IMPEACHED SWORN TESTIMONY OF
FACTS
Neither Rick Warner nor Ford Credit submitted any affidavits or
evidentiary material to contradict or impeach Zewadski's facts set forth in
verified pleadings and affidavits. It was an error in law for the trial
court to weigh the credibility and verity of Zewadski's sworn
testimony, and to grant summary judgment when genuine issues
of material fact existed.
4, THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE IS UNCONSCIONABLE
AND DECEPTIVE UNDER THE "UTAH CONSUMER
SALES PRACTICES ACT" WHICH PROHIBITS
SUPPLIERS FROM PERFORMING UNCONSCIONABLE
OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN CONSUMER
TRANSACTIONS
a.)

(U.C.A. 13-11-1 through 19) prohibits suppliers

from performing unconscionable or deceptive acts or practices,
before during or after the transaction. In this case, the
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instruments and trial court record shows several violations
regarding warranty and service contract matters.
b.) Both Rick Warner and Ford Credit have violated
the U.C.S.P.A.

(1)

Rick Warner violated by both putting an

express clause in the lease contract which disclaimed implied
warranties when in fact there were implied warranties; and by
including a service contract which by its express terms was
invalid, or ineffective without the manufacturer's new vehicle
warranty which Rick Warner omitted from the contract. XD
Ford Credit violated by representing to Zewadski and the trial
court that there were no implied warranties for the vehicle,
when, in fact there were implied warranties by application of
law, and by continuing to represent to Zewadski and the trial
court, after admitting the existence of a service contract, and
being informed that implied warranties survive disclaimer
clauses in contracts if there is an express warranty or service
contract.
ARGUMENT
POINT L
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT, FINDING THAT ALL WARRANTIES AS
TO MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR PURPOSE
WERE EXCLUDED
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The trial courts granting of summary judgment in
favor of Ford Credit dismissing Zewadski's first amended
complaint (TR-228-230) was in error if based upon the legal
theory that the contract in dispute contained language
effectively excluding implied warranties as to merchantability or
fitness for purpose. Summary judgment was granted in favor of
Ford Credit upon the trial courts finding that, in part, found
"that all warranties, if any, as to merchantability or fitness for
purpose were excluded" (TR-229).

Utah Courts have held:

"Even if there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, a summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings and
other documents demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." Lockhart Co. v. Anderson. 646
P.2d 678 (Utah 1982)
The Utah case law cited by Ford Credit supporting
their argument that the implied warranties were disclaimed
wasn't a "consumer" case but was a case of a commercial dispute
between two dealers in vehicles, familiar with commercial
practices, applying the law of the U.C.C..

In the instant case

Zewadski is not a business person but is a "Consumer" as
defined in the 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2301(3), and leased the
vehicle for personal use. Transactions, such as the one at issue
wherein Zewadski was a "consumer" of a "consumer products",
are protected from such disclaimers by Federal law. The lease
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contract instrument at issue expressly shows upon its face that
the lease was for "personal" use, and that part of the bargain
from the very beginning was a service contract (TR-17, TR-170173) ( TR-173, TR-549-554b), and Ford Credit admits under
oath that a service contract was included in the lease (TR-305).
The Federal consumer protection laws regarding
warranties states in part:
"(a) No supplier may disclaim or modify... any
implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such consumer
product if (1) such supplier makes any written warranty to the
consumer with respect to such consumer product, or (2) at the
time of sale, or within 90 days thereafter, such supplier enters
into a service contract with the consumer which applies to such
consumer product.
(c) A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in
violation of this section shall be ineffective for purposes of this
chapter and State law. "
Magnuson-Moss- Warranty- Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act. 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2308 (a)(c).
Zewadski hasn't found any similar Utah cases
involving the Federal consumer protection warranty laws, so
here cites a case from another state:
..."We next consider whether the complaint states
causes of action against Maloney for breach of implied
warranties under the UCC and Magnuson-Moss. The
issue raised here is the efficacy of the disclaimers
contained in Maloney's sales contract.
The UCC permits both the exclusion or limitation of
an implied warranty of merchantability by conspicuous
writing which uses the word "merchantability", and
disclaimer of an implied warranty of fitness for a
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particular purpose, provided the disclaimer is
conspicuous... Conspicuous writing is defined as so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to
operate ought to have noticed it...
Maloney's contract expressly provides in three
separate places that Maloney is disclaiming all
warranties, express or implied, including any implied
warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose... Such disclaimers effectively avoid liability
for breach of implied warranty under the UCC...
Maloney's disclaimers under Magnuson-Moss,
however, must be treated differently. MagnusonMoss prohibits a supplier of goods as Maloney, from
disclaiming implied warranties if: (1) the supplier
has given a written warranty to the consumer; or
(2) the supplier has entered a service contract with
the consumer within 90 days of a sale. (15 U.S.C.
sec. 2308(a) (1982).)"
Rothe v. Malonev Cadillac. Inc.. 492 N.E. 2d 497, 503
(111. App. 1 Dist. 1986)."
The Utah case cited by Ford Credit (TR-137-138, 140)
supporting the efficacy of the disclaimer clause in their motion
for summary judgment, Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford.
Inc.. 681 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1984), was a case of a commercial
dispute between merchants, not a "consumer" case, and was
decided using law of the Uniform Commercial Code, here cited:
"Plaintiff, a partnership, purchased a new 1976
Thunderbird from defendant in July of 1976...
According to the testimony of Delyle Billings, one of
plaintiff's principles, the car developed problems...
Automobile buyer's remedy for alleged defect in
automobile was effectively limited to manufacturers
express warranties by disclaimers in installment sales
and security agreement and in purchase order, both of
which expressly excluded warranties of fitness and
merchantability, and both of which were signed by
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buyer's principle and his wife... and where buyer,
which was dealer in motorcycles, was experienced
with commercial practices...
Nor is this a case where the buyer was inexperienced
or unfamiliar with commercial practices. This buyer
was a dealer in motor vehicles (motorcycles)."
Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford. Inc.. 681 P.2d
1276 (Utah 1984).
The lease contract's express inclusion of a service
contract (TR-17, TR-305, TR-171, TR-312, TR-553) preserves
implied warranties for the automobile regardless of the
disclaimer clause in the contract by application of 15 U.S.C.A.
2308(a)(c) ), and the trial court erred in finding that all implied
warranties were properly disclaimed as a matter of law. This
argument was properly before the court (TR-185-195) prior to
the interlocutory summary judgment on complaint.
POINT 11,
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
PRECLUDES AVAILABILITY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT
The trial courts granting of summary judgment in
favor of Ford Credit dismissing Zewadski's first amended
complaint (TR-228-230) was error if based upon legal theory
that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact (TR-229),
and upon findings that, in part, found:
"that statements of Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury or
its employees were not false, fraudulent nor material
misrepresentations or omissions relating to the capabilities
of
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the vehicle" (TR-229), and; "that there is no credible showing
that the vehicle failed to perform within acceptable standards"
(TR-229).
Summary judgment is available only when no material
facts are at issue. In the instant case Zewadski provided sworn
testimony, a "verified" complaint, regarding the
misrepresentations of Rick Warner and its agents as an
inducement to enter into the contract , and the failure of the
vehicle to perform within acceptable standards as represented
(TR-9-11); to which Ford Credit produced no facts, opposing testimony,
or impeaching evidence. The trial court erred in weighing credibility and
verity of Zewadski's sworn testimony, and erred in finding facts contrary to
those submitted by Zewadski. The Utah courts have held that it is not the
station of summary judgment to weigh testimony or credibility of witnesses.
Held:

"Court cannot consider the weight of testimony or credibility of
witness on motion for summary judgment; court simply determines
that there is no disputed issue of material facts and that as matter of
law one party should prevail. " Singleton v. Alexander. 431
P.2d 126 (1967), Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291
(Utah 1978).

Held:

"Summary judgment is never used to determine what
the facts are, but only to ascertain whether there are
any material issues of fact in dispute." Hill ex rel.
FQgej v t Qrand Cent., Iqp., 477 P.2d 150, 25 Utah 2d
121, (1970).

Held:

"In ruling on motion for summary judgment, trial court
must not weigh evidence or assess credibility."
Mountain States. Etc. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles. 681
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).
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The Utah courts have held that summary judgment
should be denied where there are genuine issues of material fact,
and can consider only facts not in dispute, here cited:
Held:

"In ruling on motion for summary judgment, the court
may consider only facts that are not in dispute."
Sorenson v. Beers. 585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978);

Held:

"This statement was not contradicted or challenged by
the guarantors and must be accepted as an
uncontested fact for purposes of summary judgment."
Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1121, 1131
(Utah 1990).

Held:

"A motion for summary judgment should be denied
where the evidence presents a genuine issue of
material fact which, if resolved in favor of the non
moving party, would entitle him to judgment as a
matter of law."
"A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of
the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ
on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the
required standard." Jackson v. Dabney. 645 P.2d 613
(Utah 1982).
Zewadski submitted sworn testimony prior to the

motion for summary judgment, in his verified first amended
complaint, setting forth sworn facts of causes of action.(TR-1011).

Utah courts have held that verified pleadings meet the requirement

of affidavits to defeat a summary judgment, here cited:
"A plaintiffs verified pleading that meets the requirements for
affidavits can be considered the equivalent of an affidavit for the
purpose of defeating a motion for summary judgment. "
Pentecost v. Harward. 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985).
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The failure of Ford Credit to object to Zewadski's
verified first amended complaint, , or to present any affidavits
contradicting or impeaching the facts set forth by Zewadski
leaves facts at issue, and the facts are material, setting forth
fraud and misrepresentation, which would entitle Zewadski to
relief if resolved in his favor, and so summary judgment is not
available as a matter of law. Summary judgment is only
available to the moving party if there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. The pertinent rule U.C.A .Rule
56(c), is here cited in part:
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers, to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Though Ford Credit tried to impeach Zewadski's
testimony by referring in their memorandums to a deposition,
and Zewadski cited the same deposition, nevertheless,
Zewadski's testimony was not impeached nor any facts set forth
contradicting Zewadski's sworn facts, or supporting Ford Credit's
motion for summary judgment, because Ford Credit failed tofilethe
deposition with the court.
Evidence not properly before the court cannot be considered in
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determining the merits of such a motion. In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co.. 384
P.2d 109 ,14 Utah 2d 334 (1963), depositions were taken but never published,
marked, or introduced into evidence nor read by the trial court Although both
parties cited from the depositions in their briefs before the trial court, this
Court said on appeal from summary judgment, "... we must
assume that the testimony contained in the deposition was not
presented to or considered by the lower court." Similar rulings
were made in the cases of Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and
Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 380 P.2d 135 , 14 Utah
2d 169 (1963), and Rosander v. Larsen. 376 P.2d 146, 14 Utah
2d. 1 (1962). In Rosander. the Court said:
"It deserves mentioning that the plaintiff's deposition
was taken in this action. Defendant in his brief makes reference
to this deposition. However, the deposition as received by this
court was still in the sealed envelope of the reporter. Under the
circumstances we cannot consider its contents and must assume
that it was not considered by the lower court."
Matters not admitted in evidence before trier of fact
will not be considered on appeal. Pilcher v. State of Utah
Department of Social Services. 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983); Utah
Department of Transportation v. Fuller. 603 P.2d 814 (Utah
1979); Corbet v. Corbet. 472 P.2d 430, 24 Utah 2d 378 (1970).
In reviewing the record on appeal:
Held:

"In reviewing the record on appeal from a summary
judgment, court treats the statements and evidentiary
materials of the appellant as if a jury would receive
them as the only credible evidence and the court
sustains the judgment only if no issue of fact which
could affect the outcome can be discerned." Blodgett
v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978).
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In brief summary, a motion for summary judgment can
only be granted if supported by admissible evidence properly
before the court. It cannot be granted if only supported by
pleadings, inadmissible evidence or evidence not submitted to
the court on a timely basis.
The trial court's findings in its summary judgment
order (TR-228-230) weighing the verity and creditability of
Zewadski's sworn testimony, and finding that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact , is an error in law and is
subject to review for correctness here.
POINT 111.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON FORD CREDIT'S COUNTERCLAIM AS
A MATTER OF LAW AND IN VIEW OF ZEWADSKI'S
UNCONTRADICTED VERIFIED AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE'S OF ESTOPPEL AND FRAUD
The trial courts granting of summary judgment in
favor of Ford Credit's counterclaim (TR-573-575) was an error if
based upon earlier findings contained in the interlocutory
summary judgment filed January 2, 1991 (TR-228-230), in this
instant case, which issues are argued hereinabove.
The Summary Judgment granted in favor of Ford
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Credit's counterclaim found, in part, that:
"there is no remaining issue as to any material fact in
this case, including but not limited to, such issues regarding
service contracts or warranties", "that all events have occurred
which entitle FMCC to recover a judgment from Plaintiff
pursuant to the terms of the Lease", and "that FMCC is entitled
to judgment on its Counterclaim against Plaintiff as a matter of
law" (TR-573-575).
The basis of the trial courts summary judgment on
counterclaim was that the trial court had already earlier ruled
upon the issues (TR-228-230, TR-500-501).
The earlier interlocutory summary judgment on the
complaint issued forth apparently first on the theory that all
implied warranties were properly disclaimed by a clause in the
contract and so no material facts were at issue because the
problems Zewadski complained of were of the implied warranty
nature (TR-228-230).
This basis is more apparent when an earlier order is
examined (TR-500-501). Zewadski sought by motion (TR-355366) with affidavit (TR-367-372), to vacate the first summary
judgment ; and by motion (TR-376-376a, TR-383-392) with
affidavit (TR-393-398), and verified proposed amended pleading
(TR-377-382), to amend the complaint;

and sought by motion

(TR-283-292) with affidavits (TR-296-301, TR-268-279) and
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verified proposed supplemental answer (TR-337-343) to amend
the answer to Ford Credits counterclaim, and the trial court
ruled, in an order filed August 30, 1991 (TR-500-501), that the
issues sought to be introduced had already been presented
previously and ruled upon in the earlier summary judgment order
(TR-228-230).
The trial court had ruled earlier that there were no
implied warranties on the automobile (TR-229) due to a
disclaimer clause in the contract and so apparently did not give
much weight to the implied warranty type problems complained
of by Zewadski,

however the trial court did rule that the

problems complained of were without creditability, and that the
claimed misrepresentations had not been made (TR-229), which
was an error when Ford Credit neither contradicted nor
impeached Zewadski's sworn testimony with any evidence.
Zewadski answered (TR-48-55) to Ford Credit's counterclaim (TR26-27) setting forth denials, and express affirmative defenses of fraud and
estoppel (TR-48-55, TR-50,50a). Neither Ford Credit's counterclaim, nor its
motion for summary judgment upon it, were supported by any sworn evidence
to contradict Zewadski's affirmative defenses of fraud and estoppel, said
defenses the particularity for which were set forth in Zewadski's earlier
verified first amended complaint (TR-10-11) quoted above, and other verified
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pleadings admitted into the record pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 15(b).
Additional affirmative defenses of fraud, to those set forth in
Zewadski's verified complaint (TR-10-11) were introduced without
objection and tried by implied consent, amending Zewadski's
pleadings by application of U.R.C.P. Rule 15(b), showing the
lease contract was fraudulent; an executory contract,
incorporating by express reference a service contract, which two
instruments together serve as an integrated contract, that, when
construed together, show fraud upon the face of the instruments
by their failure to provide a valid service contract or warranty,
which was part of the bargain, and for which money was paid.
(TR-549-554b, TR-542-548, )(TR~337-343) (TR-296-300) (TR268-278)

(TR-377-343).
Here quoted is part of Zewadski's Affidavit opposing

Ford Credit's motion for summary judgment on their
counterclaim, filed September 9, 1991. (TR-549-554b):
"10. The lease contract included, as a material part of
the bargain, a service contract for the vehicle, which
was included and integrated into the lease contract by
its being expressly listed upon the face of the lease
contract instrument, integrated by reference, stated in
this language:
"The Vehicle is covered by any extended warranty or
service contract described in this Lease and the
following, if checked:"
12. The service contract delivered to me was invalid
by its express terms, stating in the following language:
"The Extended Service Plan Contract coverage is
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designed to complement the manufacturer's warranty
and cannot be substituted for it.
and;
"Other Services and Repairs Not Covered:
Repairs covered by the manufacturer's New Vehicle
Warranty."
13. The Lease contract instrument omits and did not
provide me any manufacturer's warranty, or
manufacturer's new vehicle warranty.
14. The lease contract contains an integration clause
in paragraph 3 1 , stating:
"This lease sets forth all of the agreements of the
lessor and the Lessee for the lease of the Vehicle.
There is no other agreement." (TR-549-554b)
Two other verified pleadings set forth facts
admissible as evidence supporting Zewadski's case of fraud
and/or unconscionability.

The "Supplemental/ Amending

Complaint of Guy Barco Zewadski", filed July 26, 1991 (TR377-382), and the 'Verified Proposed Supplemental Answer",
filed July 22, 1991, (TR-337-343)

were verified, and submitted

pursuant to procedural rules, in support of Zewadski's motions
to supplement his complaint, and his answer to Ford Credit's
counterclaim.

Though the court denied Zewadski's motions to

supplement his pleadings, nevertheless, these two verified
testaments are admissible as evidence in this case.

They were

not stricken from the record, nor objected to by the opposing
parties, but rather, argument was had on the issues (TR-383-392,
TR-325-327), the trial court finding that there had been
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extensive oral argument, lasting 40 to 45 minutes, and that no
new factual or legal arguments were offered beyond those which
had been briefed previously and ruled upon (TR-500-501).
Utah law allows issues to be tried by implied consent between
the parties by the introduction of evidence without objection.
U.R.C.P. Rule 15 (b), and so, the sworn material is properly
introduced as evidence. The fact that these two proposed
amended pleadings were verified (TR-377-382; TR-337-343),
and found by the court not to raise anything not raised before
(TR-499-501; TR-580-582), merely makes them, in

effect,

opposing affidavits for purpose to oppose a motion for summary
judgment and doesn't prejudice the opposing parties.
Utah courts have held:
"A plaintiff's verified pleading that meets the
requirements for affidavits can be considered the
equivalent of an affidavit for the purpose of defeating
a motion for summary judgment. " Pentecost v.
Harward. 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985).
Utah law allows issues to be tried by implied consent
between the parties. U.R.C.P.. Rule 15 (b):
"(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When
issues not r a i s e d by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be
made upon motion of any party at any time, even after j u d g m e n t ;
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but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial
of these issues. .."
U.R.C.P. 15(b). (emphasis added)
Utah courts have held:
"There must be either express or implied consent of
parties for trial of issues
not raised in pleadings; implied
consent may be found where one party raises issue material
to other parties case, or where evidence is introduced without
objection." General Insurance Company of America v.
Carnicero Dvnastv Corporation. 545 P.2d 502, 503 (Utah
1976). (emphasis added)
Zewadski's additional affirmative defenses of fraud
and estoppel, properly brought into issue as hereinbefore
explained, by the "Verified Proposed Supplemental Answer",
filed July 22, 1991 (TR-337-343), are here quoted from the
record, in part:
" 1 . I believe the lease contract at issue is not
enforceable as it is void, voidable, properly rescinded
by notice, rescindable, or unconscionable, due to
fraudulent misrepresentation by the lessor.
2. The lessor sold counter defendant a "service
contract", for the leased vehicle at issue, represented
as an "extended warranty", which expressly states it
"... is designed to compliment the manufacturer's
warranty and cannot be substituted for it." The
"service contract" instrument was not delivered at the
time of sale but mailed to counter defendant after
complaint, counterclaim, and answer to counterclaim
were filed.
3. No manufacturer's warranty was provided to
counter defendant in any way; such warranty was
omitted on face of contract instrument, and subsequent
"corrections" of the lease instrument by the lessor and
the counterplaintiff still omitted the "manufacturer's
warranty".
4. The "service contract", incorporated in the lease
agreement contract was sold to counterclaim defendant
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for seven hundred and seventy five dollars ($775.00)
(about $1200.00 including interest), and increased the
monthly payments for the lease about twenty dollars
($20.00) for the sixty (60) months of the lease.
5.Counter defendant paid several months lease
payments prior to electing to rescind the contract by
written notice to all parties, and was not delinquent or
in default under the contract when the vehicle was
returned as offered in the notice rescinding the
contract.
6.Terms of the lease contract required counter
defendant to maintain vehicle for the life of the
lease, so the purchased "service contract" was a
material element to the lessee in making the bargain.
7.Counter defendant was induced into the bargain by
the representation that the "service contract" would
provide valid, effective, extended warranty coverage
for the life of the lease." (TR-337-343)
Considering the argument above, affirmative defenses
of fraud and estoppel were set forth with sworn testimony by
Zewadski, tried by the parties, and not contradicted or
impeached by any sworn testimony. The defenses should be
ruled as sufficient to defeat the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on Ford Credit's counterclaim, (and summary judgment
on Zewadski's complaint), in that issues of material fact are
presented and in dispute, and that no basis for judgment is
evident as a matter of law.

Utah Courts have held:

"In reviewing the record on appeal from a summary judgment,
court treats the statements and evidentiary materials of the
appellant as if a jury would receive them as the only credible
evidence and the court sustains the judgment only if no issue of
fact which could affect the outcome can be discerned." Blodgett
v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978).
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The trial court's finding that there was no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that Ford Credit was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law is an error in law and is
subject to review for correctness here.
POINT IV.
THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE IS UNCONSCIONABLE
UNDER THE "UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
ACT" SO AS TO ENTITLE ZEWADSKI TO RELIEF
UNDER THE ACT
The record shows mat the contract at issue is unconscionable both
under common law and the U.C.S.P.A. and that both Rick Warner and Ford
Credit have violated the Utah consumer protection laws set forth in the "Utah
Consumer Sales Protection Act", f U . C . S . P . A . " ) U.C.A. 13-11-1
through 19.
Zewadski acted timely in giving notice of rescission
and returning automobile, upon discovery of misrepresentations
(TR-348-353) (see this brief, statement of facts #5 ).
Rick Warner and Ford Credit are both "suppliers" in
this case, as defined in U.C.A. 13-11-3(6); (TR-9, 10, 17; TR23; TR-110, 111).
U.C.A. 13-11-3(6): "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor,
offeror, broker, or other person who regularly solicits, engages
in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals
directly with the consumer."
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Under the "U.C.S.P.A." it is unlawful,
unconscionable, and against public policy for a "Supplier" to
engage in a deceptive practice or act, or an unconscionable act
or practice, regarding a "consumer transaction",

including

representations regarding warranties, either before, during or
after the transaction (U.C.A. 13-11-4(2)(2J),

and

unconscionability is a proper subject for review by the appellate
court in a summary judgment matter even if it is brought up for
the first time on appeal, however, in this case it was at issue,
(TR-191-193). Unconscionability, under the U.C.S.P.A. is a
question of law and can be found by the Appellate Court even if
the issue hasn't been raised at all but simply appears to the
court. U.C.A.

13-11-5(1)(2)(3):

"Unconscionable act or practice by supplier.
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier
in connection with a consumer transaction violates this
act whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a
question of law for the court. If it is claimed or
appears to the court that an act or practice may be
unconscionable, the parties shall be given a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making
its determination.
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is
unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances
which the supplier knew or had reason to know."
Utah Code 13-11-5(1)(2)(3) (emphasis added)
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The Appellate Court is free to interpret the contract at
issut

nstant case with no deference to the trial courts

conclusions.

This court has held:

" Standard of Review. In reviewing a summary
judgment, we analyze the facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the losing party. Atlas Corp.
v. Clovis N a t i Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law, we review the trial court's conclusions of law for
correctness. Id. If a trial court interprets a
contract as a matter of law, that interpretation is
not afforded any particular deference on appeal. _
Power Sys. & Controls. Inc. v. Keith's Elec. Constr.
Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah App. 1988)..."
Fashion Place INV. v. Salt Lake County, / / o i
9 4 1 , 943 (Utah App. 1989). (emphasis added)
The Appellate Court is free to interpret the contract
must construe both the lease instrument and
the service contract instrument together

as I lie service contract

was incorporated by express reference into the lease contract
(see argument, poin

his appellant's brief), and this fact

is not in dispute, having been sworn i

dmitted, and appa>

upon the face of the instruments. ( TR-405, TR-378-379, TR3.W,

Ik I /„ IS,

IK I/O I M).

The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting cont'
"Where two or more instruments are executed by same
parties contemporaneously, or at different times in
course of same transaction, and concern same subject
matter, they will be read and construed together so far
as determining respective rights and interests of the

parties, even though they do not in terms refer to each
other."
Bullfrog Marina \UQ. y, Qjlfrert M- Lenta, 501 P.2d
266, 28 Utah 2d 261 (1972).
"In determining issue of completeness of integration in
writing, evidence extrinsic
to the writing itself is
inadmissible, and parol evidence is admissible to show
circumstances under which the agreement was made
and purpose for which the instrument was executed."
Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266, 28
Utah 2d 261 (1972).
Some further general authorities regarding interpretation of
contracts are here cited:
INTEGRATED AGREEMENTS: (1) An integrated agreement is a
writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or
more terms of an agreement." Restatement of the Law. Second.
Contracts. Sec. 209.
RULES IN AID OF INTERPRETATION: (2) A writing is
interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same
transaction are interpreted together." Restatement of the Law.
Second. Contracts, Sec. 202.
"INTERPRETATION OF INTEGRATED AGREEMENT: (1) The
interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be directed to the
meaning of the terms of the writing or writings in light of the
circumstances, in accordance with the rules stated in this
chapter." Restatement of the jaw n S e c o n d Contracts, Sec. 212.
A recent Utah case applying the U.C.S.P.A., and
finding unconscionability, is here cited in length:
"The tenant also asserts that the landlord's actions
were unconscionable under section 13-11-5 of the UCSPA.
Under the statute, unconscionability does not require proof of
specific intent but can be found by considering circumstances
which the supplier "knew or had reason to know". Utah Code
Amu 13-11-5(3).
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he determination of unconscionability is a question
of law. Utah Code Ann. 13- 11-5(2). This court is therefore
free to review the record and make its own conclusions as to this
determination. See State ex rel. Div. Consumer Protection v.
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Henrettv
v. Manti Citv Corp.. 791 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah 1990).
In Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and
Livestock Co.. 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985), we discussed the
doctrine of unconscionability at length. The discussion was
based on standards articulated in the Uniform Commercial Code,
see U.C.C. 2-302, comment 1, and on contract law in general.
The principles there discussed are, for the most part, applicable
here.
In Resource Management, the court distinguished
"substantive" and "procedural" unconscionability. Procedural
unconscionability focuses on the manner in which the
contr
act was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties, 706
P.2d at 1041, and can be characterized as the "absence of
meaningful choice" and a gross inequality of bargaining power."
Id. at 1042 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co..
350 F.2d 4 4 5 , 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Substantive
unconscionability examines the relative fairness of the
obligation assumed ; it requires terms "so one-sided as to oppre
ss or unfairly surprise an innocent party", Resource
Management. 706 P.2d at 1041 (citing Bekins Bar V Ranch v.
Huth. 664 P.2d 455, 462 (Utah 1983)); Bill Stremmel Motors.
Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp.. 89 Nev. 414. 514 P.2d 654. 657
(
1973), or "an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights
imposed by the bargain." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d
at 462.
Under contract law, unconscionability is determined as
of the time the parties enter into the contract. See Resource
Management. 706 P.2d 1043. In contrast, under the UCSPA, an
unconscionable act or practice may occur "before, during or
after" a consumer transaction. In this case, therefore,
consideration can be given to the landlord's actions during the
course of the tenancy, as well as to his act of renting the
premises initially.' W a d e v. Jobe T 818 P.2d 1006, 1016, 1017
(Utah 1991).
C o m m o n l a w inn

OIISI IIMI

.ilnlil \

V < r r \\ 11 li ,i i ctnarkably

similar overall effect, but which was decided without benefit of
consumer protection laws like the U.C.S.P.A., from another
State, is here cited;
"According to the lease agreement, Irving disclaimed
all warranties, express and implied, and assumed no
responsibilities for the performance or maintenance of the
equipment in issue. In the lease agreement, Irving did not
assign to M & H it's rights as vendee of the equipment against
the manufacturer- vendor for breach of warranty; thus, in the
event the equipment is found to be defective, as it was in this
case, the lease agreement leaves the lessee without recourse
against either the lessor or the manufacturer for breach of
warranty. It is our determination that such an inequitable result
raises the issue of unconscionability of the lease agreement.
Unconscionability arises from the inequity of compelling
payment for equipment that cannot be used without the right to
interpose a defense or set off on the part of the lessee. The
lessee in this situation is left without recourse against either the
lessor or the manufacturer for receiving defective machinery.
Although we recognize that a lessor may disclaim all warranties
in the leased goods, he may not leave the lessee with defective
machinery and with no avenue for recourse against
manufacturer. " Irving Leasing Corp. v. M & H Tire Co.. 475
N.E. 2d 127 (Ohio 1984).
Zewadski's case is similar to the Irving case above, in
that when viewed from the contract writings the overall effect of
the contract, when construed as an integrated contract including
the lease instrument and the service contract instrument, was
that Zewadski was left with an automobile for 5 years, that he
was required to keep in good order, and to see that all repairs
were made, and for which he was liable for a all mechanical
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defects, all electrical malfunctions, all rusted body parts, etc.,

manufacturer's warranty was included, and for which the service
contract, by its express terms, was ineffective due to the lack of the
manufacture i'- warranty, and finally, l.w which all implied warranties were
disclaimed, and denied to Zewadski by both Rick Warner, and Ford Credit, ni
the lease agreement, Rick Warner did not assign to Zewadski it's rights as
vendee of the vehicle against the manufacturer for breach of warranty; thus, in
the event the equipment was found to be unusable or defective, the lease
agreement leaves the lessee without recourse against either the lessor or the
manufacturer for breach of warranty.
u.^..

ice.

"(1)
A deceptive act or practice by a suppliei >.<
connection with a consumer transaction violates this chapter
whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction.
"(2)
Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1),
a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the supplier,
with intent to deceive:
"(2)(j)
indicates that a consumer transaction
involves or does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer of
warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights, remedies,
or obligations if the indication is false. " Utah Code 13-114(l)(2)(2j)
Ford Credit's representation that the vehicle had no
implied warranties (TR-135-138) was contrary to the
"

Ini
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i
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an unconscionable act, in violation of the UCSPA, U.C. 13-114, and U.C. 13-11-5 , in that Ford Credit "had reason to know"
(U.C. 13-11-5(3) that the disclaimer of implied warranties in
the lease contract was negated by the "U.C.S.P.A."; and Ford
Credit's deception violates both the U.C. 13-11-5(1), and U.C.
13-11-4(1)" whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction"; and that it was was so represented with intent to
deceive, in violation of U.C.A. 13-11-4, is evident by the fact
that the very contract which Ford Credit seeks relief under in
this instant case shows upon its face that a "service contract"
was incorporated as part of the bargain (TR-17, TR-170-173,
TR-549-554b).
This appellate court should rule that the lease contract
at issue is unconscionable under common law, and, under the
"U.C.S.P.A." rU.C.A. 13-11-5 (1)(2)(3), and so void and
unenforceable.
POINT V
SUMMARY DISPOSITION BY THIS COURT IS
AVAILABLE ON SOME ASPECTS OF THIS CASE
INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
THE CONTRACT AND TRANSACTION.

OF

This Court has the power to rule summarily on certain aspects of
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this case. Upon appeal of a summary judgment this Court is free to interpret

contract.
Unconscionability of a contract and/ or transaction is a question of
law, and imdri hnlh common IIIM

IIHI

ihe 11 ( ' S V A llnsCourl is free to

determine if the contract and/ or transaction at issue is unconscionable.
This Court is free, in the instant case, based upon the record,
pursuant to common law, and the

U)(2)(3), to summarily rule

that the contract and/ or transaction is unconscionable, if it should find ii
because the claim of unconscionability, and the evidence, facts and issues
regarding unconscionability have been tried by the parties (TR-191-193; TR170-173; TR-186-195; TR-268-279; TR-296-301; TR-367-372; TR-377-382;
TR-549,554b; TR-542-548; TR-689a-690; TR-707-711; TR-325-326), and
Ford Credit and/ or Rick Warner have had ample opportunity to present
opposing evidence as lo ihe selling purpose, and elleel l| » U.C.A. M i l ,'>( ?)
to aid the court in making a determination of the claimed unconscionability of
the contract and/or transaction, and have chosen to present absolutely
no evidence In run) i iidnl in

nl I In i \ idem c nl

unconscionability Zewadski has submitted.
The court may logically conclude that Ford Credit and/
or Rick W
unconscionability of the contract and/ or transaction because

they accepted the facts as presented by Zewadski, that the
unconscionability of the contract and/ or transaction is visible
upon the face of the written instruments of the contract.
Interpretation of law:

Regarding appeal of a

summary judgment, this court is not bound to any interpretation
of law given by the trial court.

This Court has held:

"Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the Court of Appeals is free to reappraise
the trial court's legal conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Ins.
Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The Utah Supreme Court has held:
"In as much as a challenge to summary judgment
presents for review conclusions of law only , because , by
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues,
the Supreme Court reviews those conclusions for correctness,
without according deference to the court's legal conclusions."
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
Interpretation of contracts:

Regarding the

interpretation of contracts, this court is not bound to any
interpretation made by the trial court. Utah courts have found
that in reviewing on appeal a summary judgment enforcing a
contract the Supreme Court, and/ or Appellate Court of the State
of Utah gives no particular deference to the interpretation of the
contract given by the trial court, and is free to reappraise the
trial courts legal conclusions for correctness, analyzing the facts
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and inferences : i the light most favorable to the losing party.
" Standard of Review. In reviewing a summary
judgment, we analyze the facts and
inferences in the light
most favorable to the losing party. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). Because summary
judgment is granted as a matter of law, we review the trial
court's conclusions of law for correctness. Id. If a trial court
interprets a contract as a matter of law, that interpretation is not
afforded any particular deference on appeal. Power
Sys. & Controls, Inc. v Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9
(Utah App. 1988)..."
Fashion Place INV. v. Salt Lake County. 776 P.2d 9 4 1 , 943
(Utah App. 1989).
Unconscionable: Considering the hnt|»oin^ argument,
this Court is free as a matter of law to determine whether the
c i in I met nn. I (ransaction at issue is unconscionable under both
common law and the "Utah « UIIMHIK
(see Point IV. above).

I

vile- ProU'riion Acl"

The Utah Supreme Court has held:

a*blW

"The determination of unconscionability is a question
oi law. Utah Code Ann. 13- 11-5(2). This court is therefore
free to review the record and make its own conclusions as to this
determination. See State ex rel. Djv. Consumer Protection v.
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Henrettv
v. Manti Citv Corp.. 791 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah 1990).
This case, beinj.> ;i ihspiilr nl in i pus 1 , contract,
with an integration clause, and in which the record shows no in*
the parties have claimed or suggested that the contract is
ambiguous, is sul.jtvl !•• Ilw i

I evidence rule.

43

The contract

may only be construed from its writings.

The trial court record,

as shown hereinabove, uncontradictedly presents the contract
into evidence as an integrated contract of two instruments, a
lease contract instrument and a service contract instrument,
incorporated by express reference.

As this Court is free to

interpret the contract at issue from its writings only, Ford
Credit and/ or Rick Warner have not and in fact cannot hope to
add anything to the issue, and there is no reason this court
should delay in ruling whether the contract is unconscionable
upon its face, and that the transaction was unconscionable.
If this Court should determine that, as a matter of law,
the contract and or transaction at issue was unconscionable,
then Zewadski submits that the summary judgments against him
should be vacated and Ford Credit's Counterclaim to enforce the
contract dismissed. Such an action is not without precedent in
Utah: The Supreme Court of Utah has held:
"Where ... it appears on appeal that the vendor, under
the law as applied to contracts and the admitted facts , is
entitled to recover any damages, the case will not be remanded
for new trial, but the trial court will be directed to enter
judgment dismissing the action.... Ordinarily in law cases we
merely reverse the judgment, and remand the case for a new
trial. However, where it is apparent , as in this case , that no
view that can be taken of the law can the respondent recover on
the contract in question , it would be useless to remand the case
for a new trial....When it is clear from the record that a plaintiff
cannot recover under any possible state of the evidence, a new
trial should not be allowed merely to permit the parties to
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satisfy a litigious spirit . But , under our practice , the
plaintiff's in this case may, in any event , within a specified
time, as a matter of right, institute another action, if they shoul
d be so inclined. In no event , therefore should they be permitted
to prosecute this action further." Dopp et al. v. Richards. 135
P. 98, 43 Utah 332 (Utah S. Ct. 1913)
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment against
Zewadski's complaint, and summary judgment in favor of Ford Credit's
counterclaim, upon basis that all implied warranties were excluded on the
automobile due to a disclaimer clause in the contract, and in weighing the
credibility and verity of Zewadski's uncontradicted testimony. It was an error
in law for the trial court to rule that the implied warranties were
properly disclaimed by a clause in the contract when Federal law
makes such disclaimers void if there is, as in this case, a service
contract. It was an error in law, in a summary judgment
proceeding, for the trial court to weigh the credibility and
verity of Zewadski's uncontradicted, and unimpeached
testimony. The record shows Zewadski has supported his
complaint of fraud, deceit, and rescission of contract against
Ford Credit and Rick Warner with admissible testimony and that
neither Ford Credit nor Rick Warner contradicted Zewadski's
testimony with any evidentiary material.
In defense to Ford Credit's counter suit Zewadski set
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forth affirmative defenses of estoppel and fraud, the
particularity of which were set forth in the verified complaint,
timely first amended complaint, affidavits with exhibits, and
lastly, by verified pleadings admitted into evidence and tried by
the parties as argued above.
In Ford Credit's motions for summary judgments, both
on Zewadski's complaint and on Ford Credit's counterclaim, no
affidavits were used to support any contention that Zewadski's
claims were false and that there were no genuine issues of
material fact justifying summary judgment. Zewadski contends
there are such issues, supported by affidavits and verified
pleadings, and that his affirmative defenses of fraud and
estoppel are well supported by evidence in the record.
In spite of the fact that Rick Warner and Ford Credit
had ample opportunity to do so, they have chosen to present no evidence
contradicting any of the above. No evidence was ever given or presented to the
Tryor of Fact to indicate that the representations made by Zewadski were, in
fact, false.
Though Ford Credit cited the deposition they took of Zewadski in
their pleadings and memorandums for summary judgments, Ford Credit chose
not to file the deposition with the trial court.
The only logical conclusion from the above is that Ford Credit and
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Rick Warner did not challenge the various claims made by Zewadski
concerning fraudulent misrepresentations made by Rick Warner's agents
because they accepted the fact that the misrepresentations had in fact been
made.

Therefore Ford Credit proceeded to contend that Zewadski was

precluded from pursuing his claims as a matter of law because what Zewadski
complained of were implied warranty issues and the contract at issue excluded
all implied warranties with a disclaimer clause.
This legal strategy by Ford Credit is deceptive and unconscionable,
in that they should have known such disclaimers are without legal effect in
cases like this and that the automobile had implied warranties regardless of any
disclaimer clause. The record shows that Zewadski brought the Federal
law regarding implied warranties [15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2301 et. seq.
] to Ford Credit's attention, and that their attorney's studied the
matter (including it in their attorney's fee affidavit) and did not
amend their position. Under the U.C.S.P.A., once they did
know that the disclaimer clause in the contract was without
effect, it was a deceptive and unconscionable act or practice for
them to continue their case against Zewadski on that basis,
because the U.C.S.P.A. applies to acts and practices committed
before, during, and after a consumer transaction.
The record shows Zewadski gave timely notice of
rescission of the contract to both Ford Credit, and Rick Warner,
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and returned the vehicle in good condition as directed.
This case is based upon an express integrated contract
consisting of the lease instrument and a service contract listed
upon the lease instrument and incorporated by reference, both in
the record. The complaint, and the affirmative defenses the
record shows Zewadski set forth of fraud and estoppel, simply
rely upon the writings of the integrated contract. This Court is
free to interpret the contract with no deference to the trial courts
interpretation. This Court is free to find unconscionability of a
contract or transaction as a matter of law. Rescission of a
contract is a remedy available in this case.
Zewadski respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the lower court's summary judgment on Ford Credit's
counterclaim, and dismiss it, or that failing, said judgment
should be reversed and dismissed, or reversed and remanded for
trial or further action by the trial court.
Zewadski respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the lower court's summary judgment dismissing Zewadski's first
amended complaint, and remand the matter for trial or further
proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of July, 1992.

fo

r>

Guy Barco Zewadski
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY
and FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Defendants.

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Counterplaintiff,

Civil No. 89-0901423CN
Judge Pat B. Brian

v.
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
Counterdefendant.

Defendant, Ford Motor Credit Company's ("FMCC"), Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim came on for hearing,
pursuant to Notice, before the above-entitled Court, the
Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on September 20, 1991, at

00573

9:30 a.m., and FMCC being represented by Thomas F. Taylor, and
Plaintiff being present and appearing on his own behalf, and the
Court having reviewed the files and records herein, including the
Motion, Affidavits and extensive Memoranda of the parties in
support of and in opposition to the Motion, and having heard the
argument of the parties, and it appearing from the record (1)
that any and all other pending motions, objections and other
pleadings had been reviewed and heard by the Court, (2) that
there is no remaining issue as to any material fact in this case,
including but not limited to, such issues regarding service
contracts or warranties, (3) that all events have occurred which
entitle FMCC to recover a judgment from Plaintiff pursuant to the
terms of the Lease, which is the subject of this case, (4) that
the Lease, which is the subject of this lawsuit, is a true lease,
and (5) that FMCC is entitled to judgment on its Counterclaim
against Plaintiff as a matter of law, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, it
is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

That Plaintiff's Objection to Form of the Order

prepared by FMCC dated

/ ~

^ O —

' 1"!/ is hereby

denied.
2.

FMCC's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

-2-

..nrw r.

3.

FMCC is hereby granted judgment in the amount of

$5,692.44 plus interest at the rate of 10% per annum from and
after August 28, 1989 to the date hereof.
4.

FMCC is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of

$9,267.50 for all litigation expenses in these proceedings.
5.

FMCC is awarded costs of suit, and post-judgment

interest on the whole award at the rate of 10% per annum.
APPROVED this $

¥ *

O day of September, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

Judge Pat B. Brian
003\tft\8958.252\sumj gord.pid
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SAC LAK^fcOUNTY

KIM R. WILSON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Ford Motor Credit Company
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
Plaintiff,

VS.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY
and FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Defendants.
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Counterplaintiff,

Civil No. 89-0901423CN
Judge Pat B. Brian

vs.
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI,
Counterdefendant.

Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the First Amended Complaint came on for hearing,
pursuant to notice, before the above entitled Court, the
Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on December 14, 1990, at 8:30
a.m. and Ford Motor Credit Company being represented by Kim R.

m>22

Wilson, and plaintiff being present and appearing on his own
behalf, and the Court having reviewed the files and records
herein, including the motion, affidavits and extensive memoranda
of the parties in support and opposition to the motion, and
having heard argument of the parties, and it appearing from the
record (1) that statements of Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury or its
employees were not false, fraudulent nor material
misrepresentations or omissions relating to capabilities of the
vehicle; (2) that all warranties, if any, as to merchantability
or fitness for purpose were excluded; (3) that there is no
credible showing that the vehicle failed to perform within
acceptable standards; (4) that there was no misrepresentation or
omission regarding income tax issues; (5) that there was no
alteration of the lease contract; (6) that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact; (7) and that Ford Motor Credit
Company is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the Court
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing
therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Ford Motor Credit Companyfs Motion for Summary Judgment

be, and the same hereby is, granted.
2.

Plaintiff's Complaint for Recision of Contract, Recovery

of Damages, Deceit, Fraud, and Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint For Recision of Contract, Recovery of Damages, Deceit,

-2-
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Fraud, be, and the same hereby are, dismissed with prejudice and
on the merits.
3.

Costs and attorney's fees are awarded to Ford Motor

Credit Company in an amount to be determined in further
proceedings.
4.

Ford Motor Credit Company's Counterclaim against

plaintiff be, and the same hereby is, unaffected by this order
and remains pending.

/

y/

DATED this '^L~ day of^Dejjfimbep, 19J9<^.
BY THE COURT:
S

i

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
09\bj d\08958.252\suramary.j ud
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CI)
—
Total Paymant Owa at mepptten

Ooductlbie)

OComprohonorvo It J*'A

(t)

Deductible)

D r t r a . Than and Combined Additional Coverage
t

"iorrir

BPPIC Monthly Paympnl
(a) Monthly Paymant

(8..*'*

• — _ ' * ? • * ?

(b) Uaa or Laaaa Tai
(9)

Tha Laaaor. however, la not raaponatbia M ha cannot do ao H tha
Laaaor cannot gat any rnawanea. tha Laaaaa muet pat it Tha L a i
eee aaatpna to Ford CradH any momoi paid under iha iniurence, by
whomever pptamad Tha Laiaaa euthomei Ford CradH to receive
or eottaet any money patd under tha tnawranea. andotaa check! or
o>ehe tetettnp to tha payment cancel tha tnauranca e» aattta o* re
laaaa any d a t a with reipeet to tha meurenee Whether or not tha
Vahteia ta tneured tha Laaaaa mwat atw m«ha laaaa paymanti tor
Iha Vehicle during tha tarm ot thta Laaaa M iha Vahtota la Ion dam• p a d or Paitroyad IMiaai ahe»n abo»a, yaWrta mauranpa and/or
LIASILtTV tNSLrAANCC «8 NOT PttOVIOCD BY LESSOR

f

23.03

•

Othar Char pa • PayafMa Monthly
w

(a) Vahieta tnavrpnea

*

(b) MptntpnaMa

S

<e)
Id)
(a)

•
I
t

~htk
"N/A

JLL*. m

44) Tatar Monthly Ppyffwml
(Bom ot (J) S (3))
(•)

Torm • ( »Ma Laaaa?

40

montha.

data of thta

Laaaa (Baa ta»m*naHo* provtotona pn baoh ot thta Laaaa)
IB) Poytwant Bohaduta: Tna Laaaaa apraaa to pet - * 0 _
thpnta ot S — ? ? l a 5 P Tha Itrat paymant ta dva
thia Laaaa

„•„.,

N/A

t

_

•

ma«*ad(i)

. . . . .

N/A

h Paymant wtft Pa patd daroetty by tha Laaaaa. »r ft paid by
tha Laiaor,
(7)

•

«.

Jf/A

matrrar

.

.

Hfk

Amount or Monthly Covarapa

H M L P P P P P apraai

t 23490.00 (?)

•naurad • Slpnatvra

t

25A?Q.QQ

(8)

Totpt pt Othpr Charpaa Ppyppia Va Laaaor

(a)
(b)
(10)

bach

Total p( Monthly Pa*f*onl«
((4) muttlpttad by (6))

(B)

to pay

Tptat pf Baatc Monthly Ppympnta
((?) muttlpttad hy (6)1

(B)

t

{.•••: atarltnp with

M a mount • thaI tha Laaaaa

muar pay undar thfa Laaaa and that ara net m <ha T o l l ' Month-

•Mtiat Amount pf Co vara pa

»P»a»radi 8tonat»ra(a)
piatt'tiiy
iRPwrPAPP

tha month of . F E B . . . t t 99

Pimmlvf*

in***

par

Tha rait ot Iha paymanti ara dua on tha . W T M

Pay of aaeh month dortnp tt>i law. of thit
!•*•
PAPiirpApp

^*

*./*..

N/A

. _

Fooa pnd T a i a i

I
•

Blh.
nth
«

l / l (B, - |

Total pettmptad amount to ba paid

by tha Laaaaa during tha tarm of thia Laaaa for official
•oai ragtatretton, aanifteala pf tit la, Hoanaa taai
and taiaa

VaWeta Mplnlpnanea and Oparatinf C o i t i Tha Laaina * » ( pro
atda and pay for ati p a i oti and anil iraata inr ih« Vahicia Tha
Laaaaa win kaap ir>* vahitta tn pood O'di- and • • • inm aM naadad
rapairi ara »its*
Aft aarvtea and rapafu wm ba dona wt<an naadad
but at taaat a i ottan a» aat torth tn tha own a' a manual it tha apaca
Pa'ow la (mad m. iha Loianr wit< pfovida and pay to- tha ••ivlea aai
forth Tha wo'fc to ba inn* and tha plara what* || | | |o t>A dO'in will
pa aat forth in a aaparata ppraamani or m eoupona that tha Laaaor
arm ffiva to tha Laaaaa

(11)

|

150JQ.BQ.(10)

Inaurpnea: %•• oppoeita tor typaa and amount! of mauranea tf tnauranea l i t« ba obtamad by tha laaaor. tha tolal prtmlwm ©oat during Iha torm of tha Laaan lor rnau'

anea la (a) • -H/A
t

• N/A

lo« lit a tnauranca (h)

tor plaabtttty tnawranna and (o) aatlmat-

Pd at I

M/A

,

. tor vphlpta tnauranca
•

(12)

N/A ft t?

Eieaaa Miiaapa Charpa-At tha andot thia l a a a a iha laaaaa
• • ' I pay to tha laaaor t O . 0 6

par m«a for aach mil* in a .

eaaa of 750O0miiaa Tha Laaaor and tha laaaaa baiiava that
thia wttt ba tha maitmum mltaaga thai Iha v*hi*in will h« n..v
an ovat Iha ta-m of thlt Laaaa It tha l a a a a Is terminated p-ioWprfpfilf! Tha Vahicia la eo»a'«d by any aitnndnrf wnrrnnty or am
Wca eontraet daaermad tn thli Laaaa and iha toHowtng M chacaad
D

t»andafd *•* *ah)ct# warranty proWdad by tha manufacturar or
aUatrlbHlor pf tha Vahicia

D

.

..

Aaalpnmant: Whan thli Laaaa ta plpnad by tha Laaaaa and tha Laa
por. iha Laaaor wttt a i i i p n n to ford CradM Tha Laaaaa mnat than
fnaha art pavmnntt unda' thta Laaaa to Ford Crad't Tha Laaaaa
ppraaa that Ford CradH wttt not ha»a to fnaha any rapairi lo or
maintain Iha Vahicia. pat any miuranea or parform any othar aartrtca that Iha Laaaor h a i apraad lo parform undar thli Laaaa Tha
Laaaaa win look only to tha L a n e tor thoaa aarWcai Tha Laaiaa
phatl ha«a no ripht to assign thlt Laata or any tntaraat haratn o< tn
•ha Vahicia or to aubiaaaa tha Vohicta without th« prior wrHtnn eon
pant pf Laaior and Ford CradH
Tha LESSOR aeeacti thli Laaaa Tha Laaaor aaHens thta
Laaaa to FORD MOTOH CHEOtT COMPANY tmdar tha Aaatpn
man! en tht bach of thla Loaaa

•>

ftgtwad nn a pro rata b e l l i
(13)

_«XCK.VA»NifULlHCOUtBt»lCWY
THta

Lata Charge' Tt«a l e e a a a wtf< pay a lata rhmgn en an<-h pn y
mnnt that ta not madn within 1 0 Hay* ett»i « i» dn«

.

I X C t P T AS tXP»ie»SL» PPiOVtOfO UNDfP. THIS L t A S E , THE
LCtSOP MAKES NO PROMISE »S TO THE MERCHANTABILITY,
•UtTABILtTY OR WITNESS * 0 R PURPOSE Of THE VEHICLE.
Thli maam thit thara U no pfomiia t h i ' tha Vahicia will ba fit tor
aaa for any paoleuii' purpoaa or ovan iha< ft wilt ba fit tor Iha
normal purpoaa tor which a vahicia ta aaad

Laaaor

to tha aehaduwd laaaa end. Iha pacaaa mileage charge will be

Tha

Ohaipa ta 7.8*% r>t tha paymant ©» tSO.OO, wt»tchn»n. ta Inan
(14)

Purehaie Option: The Laaaaa h a i tha option to pu<chaa« tha
Vahicia at tha pnd ot tha Laaaa lor I . . S O M . n n
„ ,h,
Laaaae )e not In drtnutt under tha Laeae The L e i i » n muat
notify the Laaaor 3 0 dayt prior to leeae end It the l e n e i
want» to purcheie Iha Vehicle Upon payment In ensh oi tha
purchaae option price piwe laaaa, tha Laaaor ahaH d*'iv«t into ^
to tha l a e a a a
7 7 / j . 7 ^
y

(16)
(16)

Laaaa Charpaa
L e e i e Reilduel Verue

(17)

Other Agreement! Tha Laaaaa promiana to hoop the agree
mania on tha front and pack of thfa Laaaa

s -iyy^.?D(t»[^Q
8.30HS,nn,iepT5

NOTICE TO THE LESSEE: (1) Oo not alpn thta Laaaa before
you toed It or it It h e * any blent t o t c e t : t a tt!',*t i»
(2) You have the right tn gel a filledm copy of thli l a a a a
Tha Laieee atatai that ha haa been given a tilled in copy
pt thli l a a a a al Iha lime ha eipnt ft and notice of the a i
ptpnmenl pf thia l e o e e by Iha U e e o r |p Ford CradH
Laaaaa

_4UT.

IIHWSP;!.

,,_&-,
Co Leeiee
N O T I C E : SEE O T H E R SIDE F O R I M P O R T A N T

INFORMATION

OU508

OTHER AGREEMENTS
( f t ) E * c e « * *aat and Toar The Laaaaa •** pay the coal ot *N
repair a to tha vahtcia thai ara not the teautt of normal weet
and leer That* eoaia inckjd* bet ere not ftrntted lo the coat
neceeaery to
W * apiece any t * « not part ot a matching, eel of to*r or any
lira which hae rata t>*« t ' i »"*h of raiiioa»rip treed(N) rape* a* meehenieel delecta
(*T) rape* or rnetece alt dented aeratehod ehkaeed meted or
miametched body pi nail pek»t or vehicle tdnntltieerton
Noma ail dented eiraiched reeled pitted broken or
mtaemp trim and prill work e« ecratehad cracked pltlad
or broken gtaaa aN liuhy window mechenleme all brokan
or burned oui kpriia uti a**elror»lc mnlfunrMion* an interior
hpt •»•»!»• burnt or worn * r * * a *nd • « damagt which
would on covered by eottiaion or eomp«anen»we tnewreae*
whather or not awe* ineurence ki eeleany m lorea
( I t ) Return ot tha Vehicle At tha and ot thta Leeae tha Laaaoa
win ratum tha Vehicle to tha L***or a addiaaa ahown on tha
r*v*r*e aid* or to auch oihar plaea aa Ford CradH may dtroet
It tha Leaeee kaapa poaaaaalon ot tha vehicle paat tha and of
tha Leeae tarm tha Leanae aha" eontmua to pay tha monthly
Leeae payment* (itnm 4 on tha revetae aide) Thai payment
ah«n noi permit tha Leaaoe to kaap tha Vehicle Tha Laaaa*
atao ahaH pay to Ihn Leader any damage which tha Laaaor may
have bocaaaa tha Leeeeo letted lo taiwn tha Vehicle at laaaa
and
CMt TarnytnaHoh TMa Laaaa aha" larmtnat* apon (I) thn and ol tha
In/m ol thia Laaaa <H) t h * ratorn ol tha Vahtcia to tha Laaaor
and (mi tha paymant by tha Laaaaa ot aH «moem* owad andnr
m$ Lata* ?h* Laaaor may fevwfcaele ma Laaaa W "
( I f I Vdrvfttorr E«ffy TarmMcMon Thta Laaaa mar ba (ermMarnd
by tha Laaaaa baio'o tha and ol tha tarm H tha Laaaaa la not at
dv'eutt undar thia Laaaa gtvee ford Cradlt and tha Laaaor 1 0
day* wrtttnn nolle* deHvere I h * Vahiel* lo tha Laaaor am)
pay* to Laaaor at once ha lodowtmj (a) an aarty larmlnMtton
fee of $200
(b> tha dtiioranca if any between tha Adluaiad
•aianea Subject to Laaaa Charpee ana tha HeeMied Veiue of
tha Vehicle and (e) ait nther amount* than dwa under thia
l a e e * Tha Ad|u*tad Utnlimrn Sublet in Lena* f hnrgaa wttt b*
figured by raduelnp tha Balance Bubled to Laaaa Chargae
aach month by tha dtfleranee batwaan lha Monthly Paymant
tltam ?{•) on ravaraa aid*) and i h * part ol tha Laaaa Ciwgna
(hem to on t*vnr*e »td«\ eeroed tn that month on an aeuiartet
b e * ' * Th* Balance Svbktel lo Laaaa C h * r g * * aha* ba cateu
lamd by adntng ihn Laaaa R**fc*u*i Value (nam ta an reveree
*id«) lo lha laaaa Oapri elation Th* Laaaa Oapraeiatton aha*
ba eaiealaiod by awbtrattinp (y) lha Laaaa Charpaa (nam is
on ra«*r*a aida) from (i) tha amount ol tha Monthly Paymonta
(Ham 2(a) on ravaraa aida) muftiptied by tha Laaaa farm In month*
(Hani 6 on tha ravaraa alia) Th* fteoMted V*lu« ot lha Vahicla
»ha« maa« tha tatr m*ih» whotaaat* »aH»* ot tha VoWct* aptaad
to by tha L aaaor and t h * V aaaaa tt tha Laaaoa and tha Laaaor do
not apra* on rha valua *<f i h * v*hle»* t h * Laaaaa may ohl*m
wHhtn tO day* * * d •• nfa awn • • p a n * * from an (ndapandani third
p*rty apraaapia to th* L***or and Ford Cr*dtt « prolaaa<o«Ml
•ppraiaal of tha whoiaaala v*tw* of tha VahleM which oovtd b*
r**ttt*d i t *a*a T h * appralaad vaK»a ahaH than ba »a*d • * t h *
•elval «*Ht« If lf>* * * n r i of t h * Vahtcia la not determined by
>pr**n»*n< or appralaai t h * R * * N i * d V*i«* ahafl b* tha net
amount r e * * * * * by f «r« O r * * * ap*h the aaka ot t h * x*Mc»* at
wneiaaate
'
( I t ) T*rm4n*tk»n — LM* tnaorarte*' Th* L * * a * a *«r*aa that apon
I h * o~aa*h of t h * inewred If Iff* ln«vr*ne* doferlbad on f h * r*
varaa aide 'a in effeet and la payabfa t h * Laaaaa and hie * a
fat* *h*H be obmjafed lo pwohaaa Ihn VaMefa from ford C/*d
H Th* purehaae price aha* b* I h * earn of (a) tha Adluaiad
• a l o n e * Sub|*et to Laaaa Charge* (aee Hem } t above) and
(b) • • oth*r amount* than due and or thta Leeee The purchaeer
ahait b* raaponatota tor tn« payment ot any appkcabia aalaa
taa nil lite )nau«*ncn ptoeaad* r***hr*d by Pord Credit wW be
appfkad fo f h * pereheee priee
013) L*a* or Oeatruetlon ol V*h«el* N t h * V*hlel* la loot or da
etroyed and the Laaaa* la not m deiauii under Ihi* Laaaa lha
l * * o — m*t prortd* * <»«b*U«t* v h l * ! * , a*tl*4a«tory b> Pord

C'edH and contmva thia Laaaa Any Inauranca procaed* paid
with raapact to tha Vehicle ahaH b* appH«d to tha purcha%* of
the aubatituia vehicle II the Laaaa* doat not provide a (ubati
tufa vehicle the Laaaaa ahafl pay to ford Cred't tha differ
anca i< any batwaan (a) the ««m oi (i) tha Adtuatad ea'ance
Subtact io Laaaa Charpaa ( • • * hem 71 above) and Oi) a* other
amounti then due under ihla Laaaa and (b) the amount of ma*r
anca proeeeda reoefved by ford CredH lor tha Vehtete
(t*,

Oof tuft If rh« Lasae* faPa to make any payment und*' (hi*
Leaaa when it I* due or u the L e * * e * laHt to knap anr other
aorn»n>ani m thia Laaaa t h * L***or may terminate th*< Laaaa
and lake back tha Vehicle Tha Laaaor may go on lha LMaee a
Prop any to rataka ma Venfc'e Era* " fha *at»ot r»fa*«t tha
Vehicle tha Laaaaa matt atm pay at once t h * turn ot (a) the
dttlnrence H any between lha Adluaiad Balance Sublect to
Lenaa Cha pa* Uee Item ?t above) a no net amount received
by ford Credit uoon lha tale ol the Vehicle at wholesale and
(b> »H othar amount* )h«>n due yndar |h»» { » « ( t Tha L * » * * »
muai alio pay aH aipenaaa paid by lha Laaaor to enforce the
Laaaor a right* under thia Laaaa including maeonabie attor
nay a teee aa permuted by law and any damage* cau*ed to
fh* Laaaor becauaa ot the Leeaee a deiauit Tha Leaabr may
aell iha Vahteia al pub«c or prtvat* * • > * with or without nolle*
>e t h * Laaaaa

( * • ) T a a * t Tha Le»«*a wttt pay alt aalaa uaa and other ta«aa and
aH iaaa amt rharpaa thai ara levied on m» Vahfie during | h *
tntm ol thia L e a * * The l * * * * e wtn alto pay an ta>ea thai * • •
Charged to tha Laaaor by reaaon ol the L*aeor a talereet In the
Vehicle e*c*pt for meome taxee
( « • ) Tttla The vahtcia wttt be H»*ed m the name ol ford Credit It
wfff be raqiatarad aa dlracta* by Pot* Cr«d« Tha Laaaoa «**
Pay tha title and repiatraMon eoata
(17) V * M c l * Uaa Th* Laaaaa w * obey • » *ewa in uaing the VeM
eta The Leeaee wtit not *ae or permit the aa* ol the Vehicle (I)
outaMe tha ei*t« where the Vehicle waa Hrii tHtad and or rap
latared lor mora than 3 0 daya without tha Laaaor a and ford
Cradlt a prior wrlltan conaent (It) oetmrte ol lha United 9tn»aa
except in Canada or Mexico K auch uaa doea not a«eaed 3 0
daya or (IH) aa a public or private carrier Tha Laaaa* ehatt not
place any etpn or mar* on th* Vehicle uniaa* the La**or
apree* io it ft tha Laaaor apreaa the Leeaee win pey Ih* coat
to r*mov* t h * **pn or merk, end a l neaded tepett* that ara
( i t ) HidamnHy Th* Laaaee wet M*wwffy the Laaaor and Ford
Credit from any Iota or damaaa to the VeMeia or Ha content!
during tha term ol thta Leaae Th* Leaaen win alto indemnity
the Laaaor and ford Credit from eft claima loaaea and coal*
anting out of the uaa or condition of tha Vehicle The Leatee
wtH pay a« Ime* tthooaad on t h * vehtete or on «*y qrwa' ot the
Vehicle dwrinp the tarm or ihi* Laaaa It ih* Laaaaa 'alia lo pay
the ftnee and the Leaaor part tha Laaaaa «m pny tha Laaaor
• t 2 0 0 0 *dminl*tr*llon oharga wh*r* p*rmrited by lew tor
• * e h ttm* t h * L**aor * a a t p*y a • * • In addNlon to any Hn* *4

{**)

• * c « m y Depoefl Any ••ewfty d*po*H h««d by t h * L***or
«nd*r thta Laaaa may ba e**d to pey *K eo*t* that t h * Leeaee

(30) WMowdm—Mn* Reeenro* Any reconditioning raaerva held by
th* ^aaaot *nd*r thia Leaae may be treed to pey the coat ol
reconditioning the Vehicle that t h * L * * * « * ahouM pay under
tfw* L * * * a pel dooe not
(31) 0*n*r*T- Thia L * * * * aeta lorih a" of th« agraementt nl the
L*aaor and th* Laaaaa tor t h * ! • • • • ot t h * Vehicle There te no
othar egraament The onfy way thia Leean ran ba chanped la
by a n*w laaaa ttgned by f o r d Credit I h * law thai win eppty
fo thia Laaaa '* "•« law of fha a(*f« who*a (ha Laaaor • place
Of buatnoee ta • * aei forth on lim front »| thi| Laaaa " that
•aw dooa not *How any o' the epreemanta in thia Lee*e tha
onea that * r * not * * o w * d wtP b* voM. T h * taat pf Ihi* L * * * «

OOARAMTt
To cava* the Leeeor to t<i*ae t h * Vehtc+e te t h * Leaeee the p*r»on(a) who aipn* p*t 0 w • • • Ouarantor pv*r*nta«» payment pf Ihi*
Laaaa Thta maana fh*( If t h * L * * * * * ' • « • to p*y any monay thai I* ow«d en thia L * * « * f*»« Ouaranior wfff pay ft wh*n aakad Th*
Ouarantor epreea to be Itound even If on* or mor* 0 ih*r paraont puaraniy payment el thia Leaae He or aha • ) • * agree* to ba bound
* v * n M t h * L***or doe* on* Of mor* el t h * lefowmg (*) piv«* th* L * * * * * mora tint* I * Pay one or mora paymenta or (b) phn>* •
r * i * * * a in lull or m pan io any el the other Ou*r*ntor* er (e) rni**ae» any aacvriry The Oeerenter aloe ptPlea thai he or aha he*
reeekiedj a *wmpi*t*d eepy 11h* Leeae and MM* Ouaranty *t the time *t etanmej
. Addraea .

re t*m f ** at

of ti
th»* Leeae at the lew* he *hjn* P end eetlee of f h * eaakyMwent of th*« Leeae
The l o * * * * *«at*a that N i h e * eeea ohren a titled ta copvot
I * ford C*ee*t
\
( ) .
%

HOflC*

• » OTHER SIDf FO* IMPORTANT INFORMATION

Extended service nan/contract provisions " ^
This »s an ESP TOTAL Service contract (with options listed in Note-1 below)
between
G ZEWADSKI and RICK WARNER LINCOLN-M and is insured by The^American Road
Insurance
Company. Under this contract the dealership agrees to repair or replace any
covereo
parts that are defective in materials or workmanship. You
will
be
charged the
deductible amount stated below for all repairs or replacements initiated during the
Contract Period. If applicable, covered parts include Maintenance and Wear items.
1.

CONTRACT PERIOD. This contract provides coverage up to the earlier of 100000
miles* or 60 months from the original in-service date, whichever occurs first.

2.

WHERE TO 60 FIR REPAIRS, It is recommended but not required that you return tc
your selling dealership for repair of a covered component (Just present your
membership care).
As the seller of the contract, your dealership is interested
in your satisfaction. If your vehicle is a long distance from that dealership,
contact the nearest participating Ford or Lincoln-Mercury dealership in the
United States or Canada.

3.

COVERED COMPONENTS.
Components, including Maintenance and Wear items (if
specified in Note-1 below), covered by this contract are described on the reverse
side. During the Contract Period, the dealership agrees to repair or replace any
covered components that are found to be defective in materials or workmanship.
For each eligible repair visit, you will be charged a deductible of $ 25 by the
dealership which you must pay.

4.

REPAIRS. Repairs will be made with service or remanufactured parts authorized by
Ford Motor Company.

5.

CARE OF VEHICLE.
Your vehicle must be properly operated and maintained in
accordance with the maintenance schedule in the Owner's Manual.

6.

REFUND. UPON WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE SELLING DEALER wi thin 15 days from purchase,
the dealership will terminate the contract and refu nd the full purchase price,
Requests received after 15 days will be refunded on a partial refund basis (Short
Rate Method).
It is required that the applicat ion for contract, contract
provision, an odometer reading or statement, and mem bership card(s) be returned
with your request. If the membership card is unavaila ble, a written statement to
that effect must be submitted.
Refunds will be made to the purchaser or
lienholder by the dealership. If the Maintenance an d Wear Option was purchased
with your contract, or added at a later date, it is considered part of the ESP
contract.
The contract and option cannot be can celled separately from each
other. If this contract is transferred, it is not-eli gible for a refund.

7.

TRANSPORTATION
REIMBURSEMENT.
If your covered vehicle becomes inoperable and
must be kept out of use overnight to make a repair under this contract, the
dealership will reimburse the base rental charges (excluding taxes, insurance,
and mileage) for a substitute vehicle, not to exceed $25for any one day ($30 a
day for luxury cars), for a maximum of five days while the repair is being
completed. The replacement vehicle must be rented from a Ford or Lincoln-Mercury
dealership or other commercial agency to be eligible for reimbursement.

8.

TOWING REIMBURSEMENT. If a covered part fails and makes towing necessary, towing
costs, not payable by insurance, will be covered for up to £45 to the repairing
Dealershi p.

The dealership is insured to the extent of its obligations under this Extended
Service Plan Contract oy a policy of insurance issued to it, by The American Road
Insurance Company, The American Road, Dearborn, Michigan 48121.

•.'&$m$*AiW>^&&£^>z
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Prepared For:
02194

ESP TOTAL

EXP:

60

PLAN-YR:

100000
89

01-06-94
DLR-ST:

UT

WF1BT80W3JM604292 MODEL-YR: 88
905708322
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Covered

Components

All vehicle components are covered against defects in material and
workmanship under the Ford Total Plans except for the items listed
below as "Components Hot Covered".
The Maintenance and Wear Option provides the following additional
services:
• Maintenance - scheduled maintenance sen/ices as listed in the Owner Guide
applicable to the vehicle.
• Wear Items - Brake pads and linings, clutch lining, spark plugs, engine drive
belts and hoses, wiper blades and shock absorbers.

Components NOT Covered
• Battery and cables, belts and h o s e s , brakes (front
hub, drums, shoes, lining, disc rotors and pads),
coolant, e x h a u s t system, filters, fluids, lights (bulbs,
sealed beam and lenses), lubricants, manual clutch
assembly, shock absorbers, spark plugs and wires,
s q u e a k s and rattles, tires, tune-up, wheel balance
and alignment, wiper blades.
• Exterior - Adjustments (glass and body parts), bright
metal (outside o r n a m e n t a t i o n ) , b u m p e r s , g l a s s ,
m o l d i n g s , p a i n t , r u s t , s h e e t m e t a l , side-view
mirror(s), water leaks, wheel covers and o r n a m e n t s ,
wind noise.
• Interior - carpets, rearview mirror, trim, upholstery.

Other Services and Repairs NOT Covered
• Repairs covered by the Manufacturer's Mew Vehicle
Warranty.
• Repairs due to recalls by t h e manufacturer or repairs
caused by damage or unreasonable u s e (damage from
road hazards, accident, fire or other casualty, misuse,
negligence, racing or failures caused by modifications or parts not authorized or supplied by Ford).
• Repairs resulting from lack of required maintenance
(failures caused by the owner neglecting to perform
t h e required maintenance services set forth in the
Owner's Guide for the vehicle). Costs of t h e s e routine
maintenance services are not covered.

• Damage from t h e e n v i r o n m e n t (airborne fallout,
chemicals, tree sap, salt, hail, windstorm, lightning,
road hazards, etc.).
• Maintenance service and wear item replacements are
not covered during the period covered by this contract
u n l e s s t h e M a i n t e n a n c e a n d Wear Option was
purchased. Services covered under the Maintenance
and Wear Option are shown above.
• Repairs needed to a covered part caused by the failure
of a non-covered part.
• Repairs to the vehicle if the odometer is altered,
broken or r e p a i r e d / r e p l a c e d so t h a t t h e actual
mileage cannot be determined.
• To the extent allowed by law, loss of use of vehicle
i n c l u d i n g l o s s of t i m e , i n c o n v e n i e n c e , commercial loss or consequential damages.
• Repairs to the vehicle performed outside the 50 States
and Canada and repairs required b e c a u s e of use
outside the 5 0 States and Canada.
• Repairs made on or before t h e enrollment date of this
contract are not eligible for reimbursement.
• The Extended Service Plan Contract coverage is designed to complement the manufacturers warranty
and cannot be substituted for it. failure to transfer
the manufacturer's warranty will result in second
owner responsibility for payment of the cost of repairs
t h a t the transfer of the warranty would have covered.

Transferability
1 9 8 9 m o d e l s - This coverage is eligible for transfer
provided it has not been cancelled.
1 9 8 8 a n d 1 B 8 7 m o d e l s - This coverage may be
eligible for transfer provided it has not been cancelled
and any remaining first owner's powertrain and major
component coverage warranty is transferred *.
1 9 3 6 a n d p r i o r m o d e l v e h i c l e s - This coverage is
eligible for transfer provided it has not been cancelled.
l o t r a n s f e r t h e remaining, c o v e r a g e , s e n d t h e
inembciship card, pics^nt nv'eage, the new owner's
nctrr.e and address, and a check for the appropriate
TPS 11 =>31 A tb\

Total

amount** to the address shown below. Transferred
contracts are not eligible for cancellation.
Extended Service Plan Headquarters
P.O. Box 1 9 0 9
Dearborn, Michigan 4 8 1 2 1
•See your local ford or Lincoln-Mercury dealer for availability of
warranty transfer and warranty transfer requirements
• • Contract Dated Prior to 1 / 1 / 87 - $25 transfer fee
Contract Dated 1 / 1 / 8 7 or Later - $30 transfer (ec (or $130 if
$100 transfer fee required for the powertrain warrantv transfer)

Note: Repossessed vehicles are not eligible for tran c fer.
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